The AES breakaway move has far-reaching implications that could redefine regional integration in West Africa, particularly in terms of monetary sovereignty, trade relations, and security alliances. The future of financial autonomy

On 29 January 2025, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—now unified under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—officially withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), marking a significant shift in the region’s geopolitical landscape.

This unprecedented departure represents more than just a diplomatic rift; it reflects deep-rooted frustrations over security cooperation, economic dependence, and political autonomy.

However, both blocs now face pressing challenges as they navigate the aftermath of this split.

From the future of monetary sovereignty to trade relations and fragile security alliances, the implications of this move could reshape regional integration in West Africa.

Finding a new approach to financial autonomy will be crucial for the stability of both the AES and ECOWAS.

France’s influence over West Africa’s economic affairs is most evident in its control of the CFA franc, the currency used by several Francophone countries in the region.

France exerts significant control over the monetary policies of its former African colonies and influences the central banks of the CFA zone.

The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) and the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) must deposit 50% of their foreign reserves with the French Treasury.

This arrangement grants France veto power over monetary decisions, ensuring that capital generated by these economies benefits French interests.

Because the CFA is pegged to the Euro, its structural overvaluation makes imports to member countries cheaper while making exports less competitive.

This setup positions many ECOWAS and AES member states as suppliers of low-cost raw materials for French industries, perpetuating economic dependency and limiting the growth of local industries.

For over a decade, ECOWAS has attempted to introduce a common currency, the Eco, for West African countries.

However, the Eco's launch has been repeatedly postponed since its initial proposal nearly 30 years ago due to economic instability, political disagreements, and external shocks.

Given that anti-French sentiment has been central to the legitimacy of AES leaders, the key question remains: how will Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger carve out a new economic path away from the CFA?

Access to ports is another critical issue for the AES states, as Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali are all landlocked.

These countries rely heavily on their coastal neighbors for access to seaports, making them vulnerable to the political and economic decisions of littoral states, which can disrupt trade routes and delay the movement of goods.

Following their official departure from ECOWAS, both blocs have begun post-exit negotiations to establish a framework for continued trade relations and cooperation.

Although ECOWAS has temporarily allowed the three countries to continue benefiting from free trade under the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS), the long-term modalities of engagement between the two sides remain unresolved.

The economic resilience of the AES will depend on the ability of its landlocked members to maintain reasonable trade relations with ECOWAS states while preserving their political autonomy from the bloc.

Security cooperation in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin remains uncertain, given that regional stability relies heavily on joint military efforts, particularly through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).

Established to combat Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in the Lake Chad Basin, the MNJTF is led by Nigeria and includes Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and a smaller contingent from Benin.

While Chad and Cameroon represent Central African involvement, ECOWAS has played a key role in supporting MNJTF operations within its broader counterterrorism strategy.

However, the diplomatic fallout between Nigeria and Niger following Niger's July 2023 coup led to the formation of the AES as a separate military pact.

Since then, Niger has significantly scaled back its participation in the MNJTF, signaling a shift from the Nigeria-led initiative.

Although recent engagements between the military leaders of both countries suggest a potential for renewed collaboration, ECOWAS’s role in restoring strong security cooperation in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin remains uncertain.

Despite the tensions caused by ECOWAS’s fragmentation, there are signs that diplomatic cooperation could still bring stability to the region.

At the 5th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum held in Maiduguri, Nigeria, regional and international actors emphasized the need to strengthen the MNJTF to combat Boko Haram, ISWAP, and other security threats.

In the short to medium term, the AES countries are likely to make ambitious efforts to exit the CFA zone as part of their broader anti-imperialist stance against France.

For ECOWAS, while the Eco has struggled to gain traction in recent years, it remains the most viable alternative for achieving monetary independence, political stability, and economic integration in the region.

A unified ECOWAS foreign policy toward France will be a crucial factor to consider, as several military agreements between ECOWAS member states and France are being terminated.

To prevent further instability within the bloc, ECOWAS must adopt a common foreign policy that balances national sovereignty with regional cooperation.